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ABSTRACT 
THE EFFECTS OF A BEHAVIORAL METACOGNITIVE TASK IN HIGH SCHOOL 
BIOLOGY STUDENTS 
Danielle Sussan 
 Three studies were conducted to examine the effects of a behavioral metacognitive 
technique on lessening students’ illusions of learning. It was proposed that students' study time 
strategies, and consequently, final performance on a test, in a classroom setting, could be 
influenced positively by having students engage in metacognitive processing via making wagers 
regarding their learning.   
 A novel metacognitive paradigm was implemented in three studies during which high 
school Biology students made prospective (during study, prior to test) metacognitive judgments, 
using a "betting" paradigm. This behavioral betting paradigm asked students to select either 
“high confidence” or “low confidence” based on how confident they felt that they would get a 
Biology concept correct if they were tested later. If a student chose “high confidence” and got 
the answer right on a later test, then he would gain 3 points. If he chose “high confidence” and 
got the answer wrong, he would lose 3 points. If a student chose “low confidence,” he would 
gain one point, regardless of accuracy. Students then made study time allocation decisions by 
choosing whether they needed to study a particular concept “a lot more,”  “a little more,” or  “not 
at all.” Afterwards, students had three minutes to study whichever terms they selected for any 
duration during those three minutes. Finally, a performance test was administered. 
 The results showed that people are generally good at monitoring their own knowledge, in 
that students performed better on items judged with high confidence bets than on items judged 
with low confidence bets. Data analyses compared students’ Study time Intentions, Actual Study 
Time, and Accuracy at final test for those who were required to bet versus those who were not. 
Results showed that students for whom bets were required tended to select relatively longer 
study than for whom no bets were required. That is, the intentions of those who bet were less 
overconfident than those who did not bet. However, there were no differences in actual study 
time or, as one would subsequently expect, in final test performance between the two conditions.  
 The data provide partial evidence of the beneficial effects of directly implementing a 
non-intrusive metacognitive activity in a classroom setting. Students who completed this 
prospective bet judgment exhibited, at least, a greater willingness to study. That is, enforcing a 
betting strategy can increase the deliberative processes of the learner, which in turn can lessen 
people's illusions of knowing. By encouraging students to deliberate about their own learning, by 
making prospective bets, students’ study time intentions were increased. Thus, it may be helpful 
to encourage students explicitly to use metacognitive strategies. It was unfortunate that students 
did not follow through on their intentions sufficiently during actual study, however, and a variety 
of reasons for this breakdown are discussed.  
 The method used in the current study could potentially benefit students in any classroom 
setting. Using this non-verbal, behavioral betting paradigm, students are required to engage in 
metacognitive processes without having to take part in an invasive intervention. The betting 
paradigm would be easy for teachers to incorporate into their classrooms as it can be 
incorporated into class work, homework, or even tests and assessments. By asking students to 
make confidence bets, students may engage in metacognitive processing which they may not 
have done spontaneously. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
During study, the learner is confronted with two major challenges: (1) to determine how 
well learned information is, and (2) to acquire the knowledge they may still be lacking. Neither 
of these is a simple problem. It is not uncommon for students to believe that they know the 
information, only to find out, during the test, that they do not. Unfortunately, when students have 
such misconceptions during study–or breakdowns in metacognition—they are likely to cease 
further study, resulting in the surprise poor performance. The larger goal of this research is to 
investigate potential benefits of increasing metacognitive processing during study, and to 
examine their influence on subsequent study time decisions and final test performance. 
Specifically, my study incorporates a behavioral metacognitive procedure as a way of increasing 
effective study, and consequently, final performance.  
Metacognition is the ability to assess accurately what one knows and does not know, and 
how to best acquire unknown information (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996; Son & Metcalfe, 2000; 
Thiede & Dunlosky, 1999). A variety of different metacognitive judgments have been 
investigated, and include those that are prospective, or predict future retention, and those that are 
retrospective, or assess past retention (see Terrace & Son, 2009). One common prospective 
judgment is the judgment of learning (JOL), which is an assessment that is made during study, 
about one’s future test performance. An example is when, say, an individual is studying for a 
Biology test and will be tested on the topic of red blood cells. Although the specific questions 
that will be tested are not known, the student must assess how much he will or will not know 
about that topic -- for the test later. His judgment might then be used to guide how much more 
study needs to occur. A simple rule might be the following: If I’m low in confidence, then I 
should continue to study; if I’m high in confidence then I can stop studying. Given this 
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progression of events, it is easy to see why metacognitive accuracy is vital for good test 
performance. The current research focuses on the effectiveness of non-verbal JOLs that are 
explicitly required of the learner.  
In the literature, much has been considered at attempts to increase metacognitive 
processing. Some of these implementations have included changing instructions, teaching 
students how to study, and even methods of increasing motivation and attention. However, all of 
these procedures used verbal paradigms. The procedure that is used in the current study is a non-
verbal procedure -- where individuals have to place bets -- and thus, better suited for people of 
all ages. During the procedure, prospective metacognitive judgments were made, via bets, as a 
way to encourage students to deliberate about their study. After being presented with a new 
concept to learn, students were asked to select either “high confidence” or “low confidence” 
based on how confident they felt that they would get the concept right if they were tested later. If 
a student chose “high confidence” and got the answer right on a later test, then he would gain 3 
points. If he chose “high confidence” and got the answer wrong, he would lose 3 points. If a 
student chose “low confidence,” he would gain one point, regardless of accuracy. The general 
hypothesis is that explicitly requiring students to make bets on how well they will perform on a 
future test will increase their metacognitive processing as they are obligated to think about how 
well they know the material.  
In sum, the larger goal of the research is to instigate a "metacognitive chain" -- by 
enforcing the non-verbal metacognitive procedure described above. That is, by having students 
make bets, or thus necessitate deliberate processing, students should, hopefully, be better 
equipped to make effective study decisions. These decisions, finally, should result in improved 
test performance.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
  Metacognition, which has been classically defined as knowing about one’s knowledge, 
has been an ability that has been researched enormously over the past 30 years (Dunlosky & 
Nelson, 1992; Gruneberg & Monks, 1974; King, Zechmeister, & Shaughnessy, 1980; Koriat, 
1975, 1993, 1995, 1997, 1998; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996, 1998; Leonesio & Nelson, 1990; 
Mazzoni & Nelson, 1995; Metcalfe, 1986; Metcalfe, Schwartz, & Joaquim, l993; Nelson & 
Dunlosky, 1991,1994; Thiede & Dunlosky, 1994; Vesonder & Voss, 1985; Widner & Smith, 
1996). For the most part, the field has focused on the ability of human adults to report 
metacognitive judgments describing their own cognitions.  
 Nelson and Narens (1990, 1994) were the first to formally design a framework of the 
relation between people’s metacognitions and cognitions. As shown in Figure 1, cognitions, 
which may include memories, perceptions, and emotions, are considered object-level tasks. 
Judgments and assessments, which occur at a meta-cognitive level, may then be reported to 
describe the state of the object-level cognitions. Similarly, the meta-cognitive judgments can 
inform and influence subsequent object-level 
cognitions. Meta-cognitive judgments have typically 
been defined as being either prospective, which may 
predict future retention, or retrospective, which assess 
past retention (see Terrace & Son, 2009).  
Figure 1: A formal metacognitive framework 
 An example of the interaction between cognition and metacognition when making a 
retrospective judgment could be when a child remembers the answer to a particular question, 
such as “What is 5 + 5?” The child’s memory for the answer, say “10” would be the object-level 
cognition. The child can then potentially form a retrospective metacognitive judgment of the 
  
4 
cognition—e.g. “I’m very confident that I knew the correct answer.” And, this judgment might 
then allow the child to cease further study of that item—changing the child’s subsequent study 
behavior. The ability to make accurate judgments at the meta-cognitive level (i.e. correct 
cognitions are associated with higher metacognitive judgments) forms the monitoring component 
of the framework, whereas the ability to use those judgments to control subsequent cognitions 
(i.e. lower judgments may be associated with longer subsequent study times) forms the control 
component.  
 Metacognitive breakdown may occur at either component of this framework. Students 
may have difficulty monitoring. That is, they could make inaccurate assessments of what they 
know and what they don’t know. Alternatively, students may have break down during control, 
i.e., may not know how to use their judgments to implement effective study strategies, such as 
allocating appropriate study time. In general, research has shown that people are fairly good 
monitors: they know what they do and do not know (Dunlosky & Lipko, 2007; Metcalfe, 2009; 
Metcalfe & Finn, 2008; Son & Metcalfe, 2000). Many studies have also shown that people make 
study decisions that are, although far from perfect, generally systematic, that is, controlled by 
metacognitive judgments, particularly when it comes to study time allocations decisions (Bargh 
& Williams, 2006; Son & Kornell, 2008, 2009). 
 While many high school students may, in some manner, be able to assess what they know 
and what they don’t know, it is not clear whether they are using such monitoring strategies 
spontaneously during study. Indeed, people who are not told explicitly to make judgments will 
not necessarily do so spontaneously (Son & Metcalfe, 2005). As a result, performance boosts 
disappear. The central goal of this research is to not only investigate the monitoring accuracy of 
student of high school age, but also to look at this scarcely investigated feature of spontaneity. 
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 If students do not engage in monitoring strategies during study spontaneously, then one 
can assume the benefits that would ensue if students are explicitly told to do so. Requiring 
students to bet might help students make more appropriate study time allocation decisions, since 
they engaged in a monitoring strategy. Assuming that students follow through on their study time 
intentions, it would follow that students who initially made bets would score with higher 
accuracy at final performance.  
 While the scientific study of metacognition is a comparably young field, the literature has 
been neatly organized into different sub-fields of study: Mechanism, monitoring, development, 
and control. Each of these, and their relation to the current study, are summarized briefly below. 
Mechanism 
 Mechanism is typically defined as the way in which people make judgments. One of the 
primary mechanisms for how judgments are made is through retrieval (Reder, 1987; Reder & 
Ritter, 1992, Reder & Schwann, 1996). Research has shown that because retrieval occurs when a 
metacognitive judgment is made, individuals obtain learning benefits simply via making the 
judgment. In this sense, the act of making the judgment is a unique learning opportunity. 
However, there is evidence that retrieval does not always occur, specifically if the judgment does 
not require it. For instance, Son and Metcalfe (2005) demonstrated the importance of explicit 
directions when participants make JOLs. In their experiment, participants were presented with 
first and last name pairs. In one of the two conditions, participants were asked to make a simple 
JOL as to how confident they were that they would recall the last name when given the first 
name of the pair on a future recall test. In the other condition, participants were explicitly told to 
retrieve the last name in their heads when shown the first name, and then were asked to make a 
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typical JOL judgment. They found that participants who were only asked to make JOLs without 
any retrieval attempt demonstrated impaired recall performance.  
 In an earlier study, Kelemen (2000) also found that that the JOLs people make 
spontaneously may be meaningfully different from JOLs that are made when the experimenter 
requires the people to first engage in a retrieval process. In this study, participants were 
presented with a list of category names accompanied by six examples of items in that category.  
In two of the conditions, participants were simply asked to either make a percentage confidence 
rating of how well they would recall the examples of the category when prompted with the 
category name or to say how many exemplars they would be able to remember on a future task. 
In two other conditions, participants were asked to say how many examples of items in the given 
category they were able to recall at that exact moment, which required explicit retrieval and 
participants. The results showed that participants who were forced to engage in retrieval were 
most accurate.  
 The above findings suggest that while monitoring can be beneficial because it obligates 
the learner to retrieve the item, the process of retrieval is hit or miss – if the individual is not told 
explicitly to monitor their learning, then monitoring, to its fullest potential, need not occur. In 
general, then, one roadblock for improving performance may be not that the monitoring is 
inaccurate, but rather, that sufficient deliberations are not made at all. The first major goal of this 
research is to see if fostering deliberate monitoring strategies can improve learning. 
Monitoring 
 Monitoring may be defined as making judgments about ongoing learning or future test 
performance. These judgments, unfortunately may be inaccurate, or more precisely, grossly 
overconfident. Individual beliefs are often incongruent with reality, and an overconfidence bias 
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is thought to be widespread. For example, when asked to predict how much they will remember 
on an upcoming test, people typically make judgments that are higher, on average, than their test 
performance (e.g. Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980). People have been shown to be so 
certain in their inaccurate judgments that they are even willing to bet money on the belief that 
they are right (Fischhoff, Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1977).  
 Koriat and Bjork (2005) demonstrated that students feel confident of their knowledge 
while studying and therefore create unjustifiably high expectations of their test performance. By 
manipulating characteristics of to-be-learned materials, such as paired associates, they 
demonstrated that when the material triggers associations during study that are absent during the 
test that follows, participants were likely to make illusions of competence. That is, they predicted 
that they would be able to recall more associates than actually demonstrated on the test. These 
unjustifiable expectations may lead to a decrease in the amount of study time that should have 
been allotted to very difficult material.  
 Dunlosky and colleagues showed that often during study, people have misconceptions 
about how well they think they know something, particularly when the judgment is made 
immediately following study, rather than after a delay (Dunlosky & Nelson, 1992; Thiede & 
Dunlosky, 1994). Furthermore, Koriat and colleagues found that when they asked people to 
predict how much they will remember on an upcoming test, people typically make judgments 
that are higher, on average, than subsequent test performance (Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 
1980).  Such illusions of learning are all too common with high school students who may enter a 
classroom exclaiming, “I’ll ace this test.” to leaving the classroom, just forty-five minutes later, 
lamenting, “Well, I thought I knew it all…”  A second major goal of the current study is to see if 




In general, monitoring processes, as well as the mechanisms that give rise to our 
metacognitive judgments, have been well established. However, the majority of methods testing 
these processes have been adapted for adults. For instance, in a typical experiment, subjects are 
given a list of items to learn. After studying each item, subjects are asked to make a judgment by 
verbally reporting how certain or uncertain they feel about a decision they have made. For 
example, when making confidence judgments, people are asked a question, such as “What is the 
capital of Mongolia?” After a response has been made, people are typically asked to give their 
confidence rating on a numeric scale (e.g. 0-100). Although this procedure has been the usual 
method for testing monitoring abilities (Benjamin, Bjork, & Schwartz, 1998 Koriat, 
Lichtensteing, & Fischhoff, 1980, Perfect & Hollins, 1996, Shaughnessy, 1979), one concern in 
using this method with less experienced individuals is that they may use the numerical scale 
inaccurately. It is possible that high school students, who don’t feel as though they have much at 
stake, may not put much thought into their numeric ratings. Instead, they may haphazardly 
supply a rating that is not truly representative of their judgments of learning. Additionally, it may 
be especially difficult for less experienced individuals to know what a confidence judgment of 
“65%” really means, as the number is used as a subjective measure. Furthermore, the use of a 
numeric confidence scale may encourage overconfidence, where people may be likely to provide 
a higher number than appropriate.   
Individuals who are less experienced with the verbal confidence scale might benefit from 
using a behavioral method. In designing the current studies, it was thought that a procedure from 
the non-human metacognitive literature might be fitting. In addition, allowing for a behavioral 
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monitoring task would better safeguard the notion that verbal responses are distracting to the 
learning task at hand. 
Until very recently, it was believed that only humans possess the ability of metacognition 
(Metcalfe & Shimamura, 1994; Tulving & Madigan, 1970). However, there is now a handful of 
studies that has shown that even animals are able to report uncertainty using behavioral measures 
(Hampton 2001; Shields, Smith, & Washburn, 1997; Smith, Schull, Strote, McGee, Egnor,& 
Erb, 1995; Smith, Shields, Allendoerfer, &Washburn, 1998; Smith, Shields, Schull, & 
Washburn, 1997; Son and Kornell, 2005; Kornell, Son, & Terrace, 2007).  
In the original study of uncertainty in animals conducted by Smith et al. (1995), dolphins 
performed a frequency-discrimination task where they were rewarded for correct responses, 
punished for incorrect responses, and given an “escape” option, which guaranteed a smaller 
reward than the reward for an accurate response. Their results showed that dolphins’ highest 
rates of “escape” responses were seen during trials in which tones of middle frequencies were 
presented, suggesting that animals could report uncertainty through a behavioral manipulation.   
This was the first nonverbal task to look at metacognitive processes.  
Thus far in the field, only two studies have been able to demonstrate that animals can 
report human-like metacognitive judgments, both prospectively (Hampton, 2001), and 
retrospectively (Son & Kornell, 2005; Kornell, et al., 2007). Hampton (2001) demonstrated that a 
monkey performed better on memory tests (had a higher number of correct responses) that he 
freely chose to take, as opposed to ones he was forced to take, suggesting that the monkey chose 
to take the test when he was generally more certain of his prospective memories.  
    Son and colleagues (Son & Kornell, 2005; Kornell, et al., 2007) tested the ability to 
make retrospective confidence judgments in rhesus macaques using a betting procedure. The 
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advantage of a retrospective judgment is that it allowed for a comparison between cognitive 
responses, which are always recorded, and the subsequent metacognitive judgments. In the 
procedure, monkeys first make an object-level response that was either perceptual (e.g. Which 
line is the longest?) or memorial (e.g. Which picture do you recognize?). After making the 
response, they made a confidence judgment by choosing a “high” or “low” bet.  The 
experimenters accomplished a betting paradigm by using a token economy with various 
contingencies. If the monkeys chose to bet high, they could either gain or lose two tokens, 
depending on the accuracy of the response. If they chose to bet low, they would receive one 
token, regardless of whether the previous answer were correct or incorrect. The bets were used as 
a behavioral proxy for confidence—high or low—in their knowledge.  
Using the betting paradigm with points rather than food reward, Sussan and Son (2007) 
explored the question of whether young children, ages 5-6, are able to monitor their knowledge, 
and whether monitoring is more accurate with explicit instruction. The results showed that young 
children can and do monitor their memories accurately, particularly when using a behavioral 
measure such as betting. Moreover, when given explicit instruction about how to monitor one’s 
memories, more appropriate decisions were achieved at a faster rate and those benefits continued 
to obtain for subsequent and novel tasks. The results of this study suggest that, while 
metacognitive processes may not require explicit awareness, explicit instructions can increase 
better strategies (Sussan and Son, 2007).  
 The third goal of the current study was to use the non-verbal betting task tweaked from 
the classic animal metacognitive studies. By requiring students to make bets, the goal was to see 
if monitoring accuracy would improve (i.e. overconfidence would lessen) and, as a result, to see 




Researchers and educators have also theorized about the notion that monitoring skills—
the ability to know and not know—develops so that appropriate learning strategies will 
subsequently develop (corresponding to the control component of the original metacognitive 
framework). For example, in adults, it has been found that metacognitive judgments may be used 
to systematically control study strategies such as study time allocation (see Son & Kornell, 2008, 
for a review) and spacing strategies (Son, 2004, 2010). In general, with the exception of a 
ubiquitous overconfidence result, research has shown that people are fairly good monitors: they 
know what they do and do not know (Dunlosky & Lipko, 2007; Metcalfe, 2009; Metcalfe & 
Finn, 2008; Son & Metcalfe, 2000). Many studies have also shown that people make study 
decisions that are, although far from perfect, generally systematic, that is, controlled by 
metacognitive judgments, particularly when it comes to study time allocations decisions (Bargh 
& Williams, 2006; Son & Kornell, 2008, 2010). In Son and Kornell’s experiment (2008), 
participants were presented with a list of synonym pairs to study for a future test. After the pair 
was presented, participants made a judgment of how confident they were that they would be able 
to recall the synonym when given the cue word. During the next phase of the experiment, 
participants were divided into three conditions. While all participants were given the opportunity 
to select which cues they wanted to restudy, there was variability in the number of items that 
could be restudied, and the amount of time. After creating the restudy list, there was a study 
period in which participants were able to study the word pairs they chose. Participants were then 
given a final recall test. The results showed that the more difficult a participant judged a pair to 
be, the more study time was allotted to it. This demonstrated that people’s study decisions are 
controlled by their monitoring judgments, and in general, followed a general discrepancy-
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reduction rule -- time allocation will be related to how far away the item is from its desired 
learned state (Dunlosky & Hertzog, 1998).  
At the same time, though, almost all of the studies, both on monitoring and control, have 
been conducted on college students, who can be thought to be relatively expert learners. On the 
flip side, research has shown that very young children, in elementary and middle school, are 
more prone to make erroneous judgments about their own learning, and as a result, will make 
sub-optimal study decisions (Metcalfe, Kornell, & Son, 2007; Schneider & Lockl, 2002; Son, 
2005). For example, Metcalfe et al. (2007) demonstrated that although children in grades 3-5 
made accurate metacognitive judgments (they were aware of what they knew and didn't know) 
they exhibited a control deficit. That is, they did not know how to take their accurate 
metaknowledge and use it to select effective study strategies. They chose randomly. Adults, on 
the other hand, chose to study the things that they know they do not yet know. That is, if they 
know an item already (as measured by their JOKs, JOLs, or an immediate test) they usually 
declined to study it. This suggests that somewhere between Grade 3 and adulthood, people 
develop the ability to choose strategically.  
 The final major goal of the current study was to investigate the potential improvement in 
study time allocation strategies in two senses: (1) Do people choose to spend more time studying 
in general, when required to make bets, and (2) Do people discriminately choose to allocate more 
time to the more difficult items (as measured by bets) than to the easier items. 
Learning Gains in Education Settings 
The major goals described above -- fostering monitoring though a nonverbal betting 
procedure -- has the potential to influence control strategies (e.g. study time allocation), in a 
beneficial way. The ultimate potential consequence is improved performance on a final test. 
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Specifically, if, by betting, students attempt to deliberate about the items, there may be decreased 
overconfidence, more appropriate study strategies, and better final performance. 
Data have shown, that people who are less accurate about what they do and do not know 
actually perform worse on achievement tests (Romainville, 1994; Schraw, 1997, also see Tobias, 
S., & Everson, H, 1996). For instance, a few studies have shown that improvement in 
metacognitive skills may lead to some improvement in academic achievement (Elawar, 1992; 
Silver, 1987). Experimentally, Maki and Berry (1984) showed that who demonstrated higher 
monitoring accuracy scored above the median on a particular test than those who scored below 
the median. The authors had students predict their performance on a multiple-choice textbook 
exam. Students who scored above the median on the test showed higher monitoring accuracy. 
Although this study demonstrated a relationship between metacognitive monitoring and test 
performance, a major question that still remained was: “What is the causal relationship between 
monitoring and performance?” Thiede, Anderson, and Therriault (2003) proposed that the 
missing piece to this relationship was the regulation of study. This linkage was first 
demonstrated by Nelson, Dunlosky, Graf, and Narens (1994) when they showed that test 
performance was greater for students who allocated more study time to items that were judged to 
be poorly learned than items judged to be well-learned. In their study, participants were 
presented with Swahili-English translation equivalents and were asked to make JOLs as to how 
likely it was that they would correctly recall the second word of the pair when prompted by the 
first word. Afterwards, all participants were given a restudy phase, where they had a chance to 
study some of the items again, before completing a final recall test. The participants were 
divided into four conditions that received different treatments during the restudy phase. In one 
condition, participants were given the opportunity to restudy the items that received the lowest 
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JOLs, while in another condition, participants were given the chance to restudy items that 
received the highest JOLs.  Those in the third condition were given the chance to restudy items 
that were previously determined to be the most difficult items on the list based on an established 
norm. Participants in the fourth condition were allowed to choose which items they wanted to 
restudy, regardless of JOLs or difficulty. Their results showed that those in the conditions that 
were given the opportunity to restudy the items that they rated most difficult (items that were 
given low JOLs) and those in the condition that were allowed to choose which items to restudy 
had significantly better recall than those who restudied items that were given high JOLs, as well 
as those who were forced to restudy items that had been objectively decided to be the most 
difficult. It seems as though the basic strategy participants used was to study items they did not 
already know. This study demonstrated the role of JOLs in study decisions, and, in turn, final 
performance. This also showed that adults are able to help themselves when studying by 
choosing to study items they judged not to know more than items they judged they do know.   
Thiede, et al. (2003) also demonstrated that the relationship between monitoring and 
performance is dictated by the regulation of study in their experiment involving text 
comprehension. In their experiment, participants who were given the opportunity to make 
metacognitive assessments on text they read, were more likely to select less learned texts over 
better learned texts when given an opportunity to restudy. In turn, those students demonstrated 
better test performance compared to those who did not make metacognitive assessments. The 
authors demonstrated that higher level of monitoring accuracy benefited performance precisely 
by regulating study more effectively. A key method of improving student test performance—via 




 Surprisingly, there have been few studies that address the issue of how to implement 
strategies for improving self-assessment and thus, combating illusions (Hamman, Berthelot, Saia, 
& Crowley, 2000; Schraw, Crippen, & Hartley 2006; Tobias, Everson, & Laitusis, 1999). And in 
general, the literature has shown that there are “good metacognizers” and “not-so-good 
metacognizers”, leading to high and low performers, respectively. But are there any data 
showing that metacognition can be manipulated to be more accurate or less accurate?  
Sussan and Son’s study (2007) demonstrated that, through the use of a behavioral betting 
paradigm encouraging young children to explicitly self-deliberate about their own learning, 
might help them perform better on the test. It seems likely then, that similar strategies would 
benefit learners in the classroom. Largely, unfortunately, evaluations of the strategies 
implemented by teachers have been either observational (adapted from Moley, Hart, Leal, 
Santulli, Rao, Johnson, & Hamilton, 1992) or through self-reports (MSLQ). For example, 
Hamman et al. (2000) conducted an observational study in which they investigated middle-
school teacher practices of guiding student learning to engage in metacognitive strategies.  In this 
study, teachers were videotaped during daily instruction and students responded to a self-report 
questionnaire about learning-strategy use. They found that teacher’s coaching of learning is 
positively associated with student’s strategic learning ability. Using self-reports as a measure of 
metacognitive skills are, however, unreliable, as students may not be aware of the cognitive 
processes they are using during study, and in addition, they may not be able to describe and 
report on such processes accurately (Tobias & Everson, 1996). 
Even more recently, as the idea of implementing metacognitive strategies in the 
classroom has began to infiltrate educational settings, very few controlled experiments have been 
conducted. One quasi-experiment conducted by Michalsky, Mevarech, and Haibi (2009) 
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examined the effects of utilizing metacognitive strategies on fourth-graders’ comprehension of 
science texts.  In their experiment, students were divided into four groups. Three of the groups 
were offered metacognitive strategy instruction before, during or after reading the texts. The 
control group did not receive any metacognitive instruction.  Their results showed that students 
exposed to metacognitive strategies outperformed those who were not exposed on a final test 
(see also Cleary, Platten, & Nelson, 2008, Zohar & David, 2008, and Huff & Nietfield, 2009, for 
similar classroom studies that showed that explicitly training students in metacognitive 
instruction improves their metacognitive strategies and academic performance).  
 Although we have seen a variety of laboratory studies demonstrating the importance of 
optimal metacognitive judgments in making study time allocation decisions, as well as classroom 
studied showing the importance of metacognitive strategies in terms of achievement, controlled 
experiments that compare the performance of children exposed to metacognitive strategies to 
those not exposed to such strategies within a classroom setting have not been emphasized. If 
children are taught within a classroom setting to assess what they know or do not know, then can 
potentially form optimal study strategies, which should then improve performance.   
The Current Research 
Little research on the topic of metacognitive processing has been aimed at high school 
students. Additionally, the majority of the research has been conducted in laboratory settings. 
The current research examines the potential benefits of boosting metacognitive processing within 
a Biology classroom for high school students.  
The major goal of this research is to see if fostering deliberate monitoring strategies can 
improve learning via more effective study strategies. Specifically, I hypothesize that 
overconfidence may be reduced when students are required to make bets about their own 
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knowledge. As a result, a more effective metacognitive chain would occur. That is, required 
betting would lead to less overconfidence, which would lead to more appropriate study, which 
would result in improved final test performance (see Figure 2).     
 
 
Figure 2: A metacognitive chain 
 In three experiments, I tested the effects of implementing a betting procedure to enforce a 
higher level of metacognitive processing. In Experiment 1, students made their confidence 
judgments and took their tests on paper. For Experiments 2 and 3, students made their 
confidence judgments and completed their tests on a computer. While all three experiments 
provided students with three minutes of actual study time, only Experiments 2 and 3 gave 
students the option to “exit” their study early. Experiment 3 also included additional groups in 
which students were not asked to make the same study time intention decisions as those in 
previous experiments. All experiments were completed for purposes of replication.  
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CHAPTER 3: EXPERIMENT 1 
 The first study examined the effects of a metacognitive betting paradigm within a high-
school Biology classroom. The betting procedure was thought to have an advantage over typical 
metacognitive procedures as it is less intrusive during study. The main objective was to test 
whether enforcing a strategy where students have to make deliberate judgments would lessen 
overconfidence and thus improve study behavior and final performance.  
Methods 
Participants 
 The participants in this study were 113 ninth grade high school students ranging from 
ages 14-16, at an inner-city public high school. The school consists of a 50/50 ratio of boys to 
girls and is made up of 47% Hispanic, 29% Caucasian-American, 13% African-American, 10% 
Asian-American, and 1% American-Indian. Students were recruited from their Living 
Environment (Biology) science classes. In order to participate, parents read and signed a consent 
form explaining all of the procedures, risks, and benefits of the study, adhering to the APA 
guidelines. No sure incentives were offered to the students, except for being told that whoever 
received the highest number of points at the conclusion of the experiment would be eligible for a 
prize. 
Materials  
 The materials were 26 Biology concepts taken from the New York State Living 
Environment curriculum standards for the immunology and circulatory system units. Twenty-six 
corresponding multiple-choice questions (13 pertaining to immunology and 13 pertaining to 
circulatory system) were taken from prior New York State Living Environment Regent exams. 




 The main between-subject variables were Bet, or whether or not students made 
confidence bets, and Topic, whether students studied the immune system or the circulatory 
system. Intention, or how long students intended to study the item (No more study, a little more, 
a lot more), was a within-subjects variable. The critical dependent measures were Study Time 
Intention, Actual Study Time, and Accuracy at final test. Intention was also used as an 
independent variable in some cases. Finally, I also looked at Confidence (High/Low) within only 
the group who were required to make bets. 
Procedure 
The experiment was conducted during an after-school review session in a classroom 
located within the school building where the students regularly attend. When students arrived to 
the classroom, they were randomly assigned to either the Bet or No Bet group.  
Study sheets were distributed to the Bet students that consisted of the following two 
tasks: (1) betting and (2) study time intention. The No Bet students received the same sheets with 
the betting task omitted. Afterwards, all students were given an actual study time phase, and a 
final test.  
The study sheet for the immune system and the circulatory system included 13 concepts 
each (e.g. Allergy - an immune reaction to normally harmless substances, or Valves - structures 
that prevent the blood from flowing backwards).  
Betting 
After reading each concept on the first handout (covering either the Immune system or 
the Circulatory system topic), students in the Bet group were asked to select either “high 
confidence” or “low confidence” based on how confident they felt that they would get the 
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concept (i.e. Arteries carry blood away from the heart) right if they were tested later. If a student 
chose “high confidence” and got the answer right on a later test, then he would gain 3 points. If 
he chose “high confidence” and got the answer wrong, he would lose 3 points. If a student chose 
“low confidence,” he would gain one point, regardless of accuracy1. Students were made aware 
of the betting contingencies, and were also told that those with the highest score at the end would 
be eligible for a prize. Students assigned to the No Bet group were not given the opportunity to 
make metacognitive judgments through betting.  
 Bet Group      No Bet Group 
Figure 3: Sample excerpts of the betting and study time intention phases of study for the Bet and No Bet groups. 
 After making this judgment, students were asked to decide how much more they felt they 
needed to study each concept, if they were to be given a test later, by selecting either  “a lot 
more,” “a little more,” or “not at all.” Students in the No Bet group did not make bets, and 
instead, received a handout that only asked them to decide how much more they felt they needed 
to study each concept. Sections of the handouts students received are shown in Figure 3.  
                                                
1 Points were not lost when the "low confidence" option was selected because that option was intended to act as an "I pass", or "I don't want to 
bet" type of judgment – as opposed to a punishment. The same betting contingencies were used in Kornell, Son, and Terrace (2007).  
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Actual Study Time 
 After students completed the prospective betting phase in a regular classroom, they were 
escorted into a computer lab to complete the actual study time phase. Each student was assigned 
to an individual Macintosh computer. The 13 key terms that corresponded to the thirteen 
statements on the initial handout (i.e. Arteries) were presented on the screen in a circular array. 
When a student clicked on a particular term, the definition of the term appeared in the center of 
the screen (Arteries are blood vessels that carry blood away from the heart) and the other key 
terms disappeared, allowing the student to focus on the chosen concept. When the student 
wanted to return to the original screen, he or she clicked on the center of the screen and the array 
of thirteen terms reappeared. Students had three minutes to study whichever terms they selected 
for any duration during those three minutes. Students were able to select the same concept more 
than once, or not choose a concept at all. The amount of remaining time was continuously 
displayed at the bottom right-hand corner of the 
screen. See Figure 4. 
 





Final Test  
 For the final phase of the experiment, students were brought back to the original 
classroom where they completed the betting phase. During the test phase, each student received a 
second handout containing 13 multiple-choice questions that corresponded to the 13 key 
concepts from the initial handout (i.e. Arteries are blood vessels that (1) contain striated muscles 
(2) carry blood toward the heart (3) readily exchange materials between the blood and body cells 
(4) carry blood away from the heart). After completing each question, only students in the No 
Bet group (those that had not made confidence judgments during study), were asked to make a 
retrospective judgment using, again, confidence bets. They were asked to select either “high 
confidence” or “low confidence” based on how confident they were that they provided accurate 
answers. This was done for the purpose of equalizing the total number of points all participating 
students can potentially earn during the experiment. Students were told that those with the 
highest score would be eligible for a prize.       
Results 
 For this study and remaining studies, analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted in 
order to assess the impact of betting on high school students’ study time allocation intentions, 
actual study time, and accuracy performance. Unless otherwise noted, all are repeated measures 
ANOVA. A probability level of p<. 05 was used as the criterion for statistical significance. 
Estimates of effect size were calculated as partial eta-squared. During study time intention 
choices, a selection of “not at all” was coded as 0, “a little more” was coded as 1, and “a lot 
more” was coded as 2. Low bets were coded as 0 and high bets were coded as 1. The main 
dependent measures were study time Intention, Actual Study Time, and Accuracy at final 
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performance. There were 55 students in the Bet group, and 58 students were assigned to the No 
Bet group.  
Primary Analyses 
 Accuracy. I begin the analyses with the assumption that requiring students to make bets 
would successfully instigate a metacognitive chain that would lead to better study and eventually 
to final test performance. Do students who were required to bet perform better than those were 
not required to bet? The ANOVA was conducted in order to see if there was a difference in 
Accuracy as a function of Bet and Intention. Mean intention scores (between 0-2) were 
calculated for each participant. Means and standard errors for Accuracy are presented in Table 1. 
Note the decrease in the N, because some subjects did not choose all three intention options. In a 
later section below, I repeat the analyses combining “a little more” and “a lot more” for more 
power. 
Condition    N   M   SE 
Bet     29  
 Not at all      0.82   0.05   
 A little more      0.81   0.04 
 A lot more      0.80   0.07 
No Bet     15 
 Not at all      0.84   0.07 
 A little more      0.72   0.05 
 A lot more      0.65   0.09 
Table 1: Means and standard errors for Accuracy by Bet and Intention to Study  
 While was no significant difference in accuracy by Bet, there was a trend by Intention 
(F(2, 84) = 2.39, MSE = .11, p=.10,  eta = .05). Accuracy was highest for items that students 
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intended to study the least, which may be expected since those are the items that are likely to be 
judged as easy to learn or already known.   
 Study time Intention. Table 2 shows the number of times students in each Bet condition 
selected “not at all,” “a little more,” or “a lot more" to indicate how much more they intended to 
study. 
 
   Not at all (0)  A little more (1) A lot more (2)  Total 
Bet   199 (27.7%)  393 (54.7%)  126 (17.5%)  718 
No Bet   422 (55.2%)  282 (36.9%)  61 (8.0%)  765 
Table 2: Frequency and percents of Intention to Study by Bet 
 The average Intention (between 0-2), for 13 items, was also calculated for each student. 
The means and standard errors are provided in Table 3.  
 
Condition   N   M   SE 
Bet    55   1.90   0.05 
No Bet    58   1.53   0.02 
Table 3: Means and standard errors for Intention to Study as a function of Bet  
 A Univariate ANOVA resulted in a significant effect of Bet (F(1, 113) = 24.72, MSE = 
3.77, p= <.05, eta = .18), indicating that students who bet had a tendency to intend to study, on 
average, for a longer period of time than those who did not bet. 
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 Actual Study Time. Due to the fact that students who bet had a tendency to intend to 
study, on average, for a longer period of time than those who did not bet, it was then of interest 
to see if there was a difference in actual study time. The means and standard errors for Actual 
Study Time by Bet and Intention are shown in Table 42.  
Condition    N   M   SE 
Bet     28  
 Not at all      6.59   0.89   
 A little more      7.80   0.86 
 A lot more      12.19   2.36 
No Bet     15 
 Not at all      7.01   1.20 
 A little more      10.13   1.18 
 A lot more      10.43   3.23 
Table 4: Means and standard errors for Actual Study Time as a function of Bet and Intention to Study 
 The ANOVA resulted in a significant effect of Intention (F (2, 82) = 2.56, MSE = 198.75, 
p <.05, eta = .06), indicating that students had a tendency to spend a greater amount of time 
studying items they intended to study “a lot more” compared to those they intended to study for a 
shorter amount of time.  
 Although a significant interaction was not found, there appears to be a greater numerical 
increase in Actual Study Time by Intention for those who bet compared to those who did not bet. 
This same basic pattern was seen for those who did not bet, but not as strongly. To delve further, 
                                                
2 Note the loss in N due to the fact that a student chose not to study any of the items. This N is 
likely to increase in a later analysis where I combine the intention choices.  
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an ANOVA for Actual Study Time by Intention was conducted for each Bet/No Bet group 
separately, since there appeared to be a numerical pattern difference between the two groups. 
Indeed, this analysis resulted in a trend for Intention (F (2, 54) = 2.48, MSE = 97.79, p =.09, eta 
= .08) for those who bet. A trend was not found for those who did not bet. 
Monitoring Accuracy: High Bets vs. Low Bets 
 I also examined how accurate students were at monitoring, as opposed to processing -- in 
only those that made bets. In order to test this, I looked at students’ selection of high bet and low 
bet items in relation to study and test performance.  
 In general, those students in the Bet group expressed high confidence. That is, they 
preferred to select the high bet option over the low bet option. The first two columns of Table 5 
shows the frequency and percentages of the number of times high bet and low bet were selected 
across all participants. The second column shows the individual average number of high and low 
bet selections out of 13 items. 
 
   Frequency   Percent  Mean/Individual 
Low Bet   251    33.70   4.40   
High Bet   493    66.30   8.66   
Total    744 
Table 5: Frequencies and means for selection of high and low bets 
 Accuracy. The means for each individual’s final performance scores for the 13 items 
were calculated. Then, the ANOVA was conducted in order to see if there was a difference in 
final Accuracy as a function of Confidence (high or low bet). This analysis looked only at 
students in the Bet group. The means and standard errors for Accuracy as a function of type of 
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Confidence are shown in the table below, in addition to those in the No Bet group, for 
comparison (see Table 63). 
 
Type of Bet   N     M    SE  
No Bet    58    0.83    0.02 
Low Bet   50    0.79    0.04 
High Bet   50    0.84    0.03 
Table 6: Means and standard errors for Accuracy as a function of Confidence (High, Low Bet) and Condition  
 The ANOVA did not result in any significant effects. Students appeared to do well on all 
items during final test, regardless of Bet or Confidence.   
 Study Time Intention. Although there was no difference in final accuracy as a function of 
Bet or Confidence, I wanted to see if students differentiated their study time intentions based on 
their confidence for each item. The means and errors for Intention as a function of Confidence, in 
addition to the No Bet group for comparison, are presented in Table 74. 
  
Type of Bet    N    M   SE  
No Bet     58   0.53   0.05 
Low Bet    47   1.41   0.06 
High Bet    47   0.71   0.04 
Table 7: Means and standard errors for Intention to Study as a function of Confidence (High, Low Bet) and 
Condition 
                                                
3 Note the decrease in N due to the fact that some students did not choose both high bet and low 
bet. 
4 Note the decrease in N due to the fact that some students did not provide an intention response 
(In later experiments, the intention response is required). 
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 The ANOVA resulted in a significant effect of Confidence (F(1, 48) = 6.09, MSE = 
60.18, p<.05, eta = .11), indicating that students wanted to spend a longer amount of time 
studying items they selected for low bet than for those items they selected for high bet. 
 Actual Study Time. Do students follow through on their study intentions? In other words, 
did they spend a longer amount of time studying the low bet items? The means and standard 
errors for Actual Study Time by Confidence are shown in Table 85.  
  
Type of Bet   N    M   SE  
No Bet    58   8.14   0.25 
Low Bet   49   10.96   1.33 
High Bet   49   7.09   0.56 
Table 8: Means and standard errors for Actual Study Time as a function Confidence (High, Low Bet) and Condition 
 The ANOVA resulted in a significant effect of Confidence (F(1, 48) = 6.09, MSE = 
60.18, p<.05, eta = .11), indicating that students indeed spent a longer amount of time on the low 
bet items than the high bet items.   
Secondary Analyses: Combining “A lot more study” and “A little more study” 
 The variable of study time Intention was then collapsed into two levels, instead of three. 
A study time Intention of either  “a little more” or “a lot more” were combined into one category, 
“more study,” which was coded as a “1,” while a study time intention of “not at all” was labeled 
the other category, “no more study,” which was coded as a “0.” Essentially, this was done 
because a student may have had difficulty distinguishing between what it means to want to study 
an item “a lot more” versus “a little more.” Combining in this way would also increase the 
                                                
5 Note the decrease in N due to the fact that a student chose not to study any of the items. 
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number of subjects that could be analyzed. The dependent measures of interest were Accuracy 
and Actual Study Time. 
 Accuracy. The ANOVA was conducted in order to see if there was a difference in 
performance as a function of Bet and Combined Intention. Mean combined intention scores 
(between 0-1) and standard errors were calculated for each participant. See Table 96.  
 
Condition    N    M  SE  
Bet     40 
 No more study     0.87  0.03 
 More study      0.84  0.03 
No Bet     51 
 No more study      0.89  0.03 
 More study      0.80  0.03 
Table 9: Means and standard errors for Accuracy as a function of Bet and Combined Intention to Study  
 The ANOVA resulted in a significant effect of Combined Intention (F(1, 1453) = 31.52, 
MSE = 4.32, p<.05, eta = .02), indicating that students had a tendency to do better on items they 
did not intend to study and worse on items they intended to study more.   
 Actual Study Time. Means and standard errors for Actual Study Time as a function of Bet 
and Combined Intention are presented in Table 10. 
 
 
                                                
6 Note the increase in N as compared to the same analyses above, as a result of combining two of 





Condition    N    M  SE  
Bet     40 
 No more study     6.73  0.51 
 More study      9.73  0.57 
No Bet     51 
 No more study      7.16  0.75 
 More study      8.60  0.47 
Table 10: Means and standard errors for Actual Study Time as a function of Bet and Combined Intention to Study  
 The ANOVA resulted in a significant effect of Combined Intention (F(1, 1466) = 14.30, 
MSE = 1586.33, p <.05, eta = .01), indicating that students spent more time studying items they 
intended to study more than items they did not intend to study. 
Conclusion 
 The data indicated the following: (1) Students who made metacognitive judgments, 
through betting, had intentions of studying the items for a longer amount of time than those who 
did not make bets. (2) Regardless of students’ intentions, there was no difference in the amount 
of actual time students studied, which in turn, did not result in any difference in accuracy at final 
test. (3) Students intended to study low bet items for a longer period of time than high bet items. 
And, (4) Students spent a longer amount of time studying low bet items as opposed to high bet 




CHAPTER 4: EXPERIMENT 2 
 Experiment 2 was conducted in an effort to replicate the findings of Experiment 1. Here, 
however, the entire experiment was completed on the computer. Furthermore, this time, students 
were given the option to “exit”, or opt out, during the actual study time phase. With the addition 
of the exit button, I could examine which students persist in study, and which did not.  
 Based on the findings from Experiment 1, I expect that those who bet will have better 
study time intentions, but unfortunately, may not follow through on them. On the other hand, 
given that the all phases are on the computer, it could also be that they do study for longer than 
they had in Experiment 1.  
Participants 
 The participants in this study were 52 ninth grade high school students ranging from ages 
14-16, at the same inner-city public high school as the Experiment 1. Students were again 
recruited from their Living Environment science classes. None of the participants had 
participated in the previous experiment.   
Materials  
 In order to get a wider range of performance than Experiment 1, the materials were a 
mixture of 24 Biology concepts taken from the New York State Living Environment curriculum 
standards that students previously learned for a variety of units. Twenty-four corresponding fill-
in-the-blank questions were created to correspond with the concepts. The concepts and questions 
are presented in Appendix B. 
Design 
  The design was similar to that of Experiment 1, except that all students completed 2 
sessions. The independent variables were Bet—or whether or not students made confidence 
judgments, and Intention—or how long students intended to study the item. Bet was a between-
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subjects variable while Intention was a within-subjects variable. The dependent measures were 
Intention, Actual Study Time and Accuracy at final test. Intention was also used as an 
independent variable. Confidence (High/Low bet) was analyzed within the group that bet only. 
Procedure 
 The procedure for Experiment 2 was almost identical to the procedure for Experiment 1. 
This time, however, all phases of the experiment were completed on the computer, as opposed to 
paper handouts. Additionally, during the actual study time phase, students were given the option 
to “exit” study if they felt they did not want to study anymore. When students arrived to the 
computer room, they were randomly assigned a number. The computer then randomly assigned 
them to one of two groups, Bet or No Bet.  Students 
completed the experiment twice, directly after each 
other. Each time, 12 different concepts were used.  
Betting  
During this initial phase, a concept appeared 
in the center of the computer screen for four and a 
half seconds. After reading the concept, students in 
the Bet group were asked to select either “high 
confidence” or “low confidence” based on how 
confident they felt that they would get the concept 
right if they were tested later (Figure 5). The point 
system was the same as Experiment 1. Students 
assigned to the No Bet group only read the concepts.  Figure 5: A sample trial of making bets and  
        study time intentions. 
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 After making a betting judgment, students in the Bet group were then asked to decide 
how much more time they needed to study each concept, if they were to be given a test later, by 
selecting either  “a lot more,” “a little more,” or “not at all”. Students in the No Bet group were 
asked to decide how much more they needed to study each concept immediately following the 
presentation of the concept (since they did not make bets). Intention responses were required. 
Actual Study Time  
 After students completed the betting and intention tasks, the 12 key terms that 
corresponded to the twelve concepts were presented on the screen in a circular array and students 
were able to study them in the same manner that they did in Experiment 1 for three minutes. The 
amount of time remaining was continuously displayed at the bottom right-hand corner of the 
screen. At the bottom left-hand corner of the screen, there was an “exit” option which students 
were able to select at any time (Figure 6). When they selected the “exit” option, their study 





Figure 6:  The screen students saw 
during the actual study time phase with 




 During the test phase, students were asked to fill in the term that best described the 
supplied definition. After completing each question, only students in the No Bet group were 
asked to make a retrospective judgment using, again, confidence bets.  
Results 
 The same coding and analyses that were completed for Experiment 1 were completed for 
Experiment 2. For this experiment, however, the added variable of Session was included, 
because each student completed the experiment twice. The same dependent measures of study 
time Intention, Actual Study Time, and Accuracy at final performance were examined. There 
were 25 students in the Bet group and 27 students in the No Bet group. 
Primary Analyses 
 Accuracy. The means and standard errors for Accuracy at final test performance are 
presented in Table 11. Note the decrease in the N, because some subjects did not choose all three 
intention options. 
Condition    N   M   SE 
Bet     15  
 Not at all      0.71   0.08   
 A little more      0.55   0.09 
 A lot more      0.49   0.10 
No Bet     15 
 Not at all      0.56   0.08 
 A little more      0.47   0.09 
 A lot more      0.51   0.10 
Table 11: Means and standard errors for Accuracy by Bet and Intention to Study 
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 There was no significant difference in Accuracy by Bet. However, the ANOVA resulted 
in a significant effect of Intention (F(2, 56) = 3.23, MSE = .18, p < .05, eta = .10), indicating that 
accuracy was highest for items that students intended to study the least.  
 Study Time Intention. Table 12 shows the number of times all students in the Bet/No Bet 
groups selected “not at all,” “a little more,” or “a lot more” to indicate how much more they 
intended to study. 
 
   Not at all (0)  A little more (1) A lot more (2)  Total 
Bet   199 (36%)  219 (39.7%)  134 (24.3%)  552 
No Bet   387 (64.5%)  167 (27.8%)  46 (7.7%)  600  
Table 12: Frequency and percents of study time Intention by Bet.  
 The means and standard errors for Intention by Bet and Session are shown in Table 13. 
 
Condition   N   M   SE 
Bet    25 
 Session 1     0.79   0.08 
 Session 2     1.01   0.01 
No Bet    27 
 Session 1     0.45   0.08 
 Session 2     0.32   0.10 
Table 13: Mean and standard errors for Intention to Study as a function of Bet and Session  
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 The ANOVA resulted in a significant interaction (F(1, 42) = 18.23, MSE = .04, p<.05, 
eta = .30). That is, those who bet intended to study significantly more than those who didn't bet, 
especially during Session 2. 
 Actual Study Time. The means and standard errors for Actual Study Time by Bet and 
Intention are shown in the Table 147. 
 
Condition    N   M   SE 
Bet     15  
 Not at all      1.00   0.48   
 A little more      1.89   0.77 
 A lot more      2.98   1.37 
No Bet     15 
 Not at all      1.85   0.48 
 A little more      3.73   0.77 
 A lot more      4.14   1.37 
Table 14: Means and standard errors for Actual Study Time as a function of Bet and Intention to Study 
 The ANOVA resulted in a significant effect of Intention (F (2, 56) = 3.77, MSE = 35.21, 
p < .05, eta = .12), indicating that students had a tendency to spend a greater amount of time 
studying items they intended to study “a lot more” compared to those they intended to study for a 
shorter amount of time.  
 Although a significant interaction was not found, there appeared to be a greater numerical 
increase in Actual Study Time by Intention for those who bet compared to those who did not bet.  
                                                




This same basic pattern was seen for those who did not bet, but not as strongly. Again, as in 
Experiment 1, to delve further, repeated measures ANOVA for Actual Study Time by Intention 
was then conducted for each Bet/No Bet group separately. This analysis resulted in a trend for 
Intention (F (2, 28) = 2.62, MSE = 5.64, p = .09, eta = .16) for those who bet. A trend was not 
found for those who did not bet.  
Monitoring Accuracy: High Bets vs. Low Bets 
 Similar to Experiment 1, students in the Bet group initially expressed high confidence. 
Table 15 shows the frequency and percentages of the number of times high bet and low bet was 
selected across participants. The second column shows the average individual number of high 
and low bet selections out of 13 items. 
 
    Frequency  Percent  Mean/Individual  
Session 1 
 Low Bet   124   43.1%   5.17   
 High Bet  164   56.9%   6.83   
 Total   288 
Session 2 
 Low Bet  140   53.0%    6.36   
 High Bet  124   47.0%   5.64   
 Total   264 
Table 15: Frequencies and means for selection of high and low bets. 
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 Accuracy. The means and standard errors for Accuracy as a function of Confidence are 
shown in Table 168, in addition to those in the No Bet group, for comparison.  
Type of Bet   N    M   SE  
No Bet    25   0.58   0.05 
Low Bet   23   0.36   0.06 
High Bet   23   0.70   0.06 
Table 16: Means and standard errors for Accuracy as a function of Confidence (High, Low Bet) and Condition 
 The ANOVA resulted in a significant effect of Confidence (F(1, 16) = 23.07, MSE = .96, 
p<.05, eta = .59), indicating that students remembered the high bet items better than the low bet 
items. 
 Study Time Intention. The means and errors for Intention as a function of Confidence, in 
addition to the No Bet group for comparison are shown in Table 17.  
Type of Bet   N    M   SE  
No Bet    25   0.87   0.10    
Low Bet   23   1.31   0.09 
High Bet   23   0.54   0.08 
Table 17: Means and standard errors for Intention to Study as a function of Confidence (High, Low Bet) and 
Condition.  
 The ANOVA, for only those who bet, resulted in a significant effect of Confidence (F(1, 
22) = 64.62, MSE = .11, p<.05, eta = .75), indicating that students wanted to spend a longer 
amount of time studying the low bet items than the high bet items. 
                                                
8 Note the decrease in N due to the fact that some students did not choose both high and low bet.  
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 Actual Study Time. The means and errors for Actual Study Time as a function of 
Confidence are shown in Table 18. 
 
Type of Bet   N    M   SE  
No Bet    25   2.16   0.49 
Low Bet   23   2.86   0.75 
High Bet   23   1.59   0.42 
Table 18: Means and errors for Actual Study Time as a function of Confidence(High, Low Bet)  and Condition 
 The ANOVA, for only those who bet, resulted in a significant effect of Confidence (F(1, 
16) = 4.97, MSE = 14.20, p< .05, eta = .24), indicating that students spent a longer amount of 
time studying the low bet items rather than high bet items. 
Secondary Analyses: Combining “A lot more study” and “A little more study” 
 Just as in the first experiment, the variable of study time Intention was collapsed into two 
levels, instead of three. The dependent measures were Accuracy and Actual Study Time.  
 Accuracy. The means and standard errors for Accuracy as a function of Bet and 






                                                





Condition    N    M  SE  
Bet     19 
 No more study     0.72  0.03 
 More study      0.58  0.03 
No Bet     25 
 No more study      0.67  0.02 
 More study      0.56  0.03 
Table 19: Means and standard errors for Accuracy as a function of Bet and Combined Intention to Study   
 An ANOVA resulted in a significant effect of Combined Intention (F(1, 42) =13.12, MSE 
= .04, p< .05, eta = .24), indicating that students did better on items they did not want to study at 
all compared to items they wanted to study more. 
 Actual Study Time. The means and standard errors for the Actual Study Time as a function 
of Bet and Combined Intention are shown in Table 20. An ANOVA resulted in a significant 
effect of Combined Intention (F(1, 42) =24.75, MSE = 4.33, p = <.05, eta = .37), indicating that 










Condition    N    M  SE  
Bet     19 
 No more study     1.32  0.40 
 More study      3.04  0.80 
No Bet     25 
 No more study      1.63  0.35 
 More study      4.37  0.70 
Table 20: Means and errors for Actual Study Time as a function of Bet and Combined Intention to Study  
Conclusion 
 The data from Experiment 2 replicated many of the findings from Experiment 1. Students 
who made bets had intentions of studying longer than student who did not make bets. Regardless 
of intentions, however, students who bet did not actually study longer; thus, no difference at final 
test. Students did spend a longer time studying low bet items as opposed to high bet items. 
Nevertheless, that additional amount of time was not sufficient to bring performance up: High 
bet items were still remembered significantly better than low bet items.  
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CHAPTER 5: EXPERIMENT 3 
Experiment 3 was conducted in an effort to replicate the findings of Experiments 1 and 2, 
as well as to examine the role of making study time intention judgments. Given the results from 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, neither changes in actual study time nor boosts in final 
performance are necessarily expected to occur. I do, however, hypothesize that those who bet 
will have intentions to study significantly more - a strategy that has never been addressed in the 
literature. 
Participants 
 The participants in this study were 98 ninth grade high school students ranging from ages 
14-16, at the same inner-city public high school as the previous experiments. Students were 
again recruited from their Living Environment science classes. None of the participants had 
participated in previous experiments.   
Materials  
 The materials used in this experiment were identical to those used in Experiment 2.  
Design 
  A between-subjects design was used where one-fourth of the students made confidence 
bets and intentions, one-fourth of the students made confidence bets and no intentions, one-
fourth of the students did not make confidence bets but did make intentions, and one-fourth of 
the students did not make confidence judgments nor did they make intentions.  
 The crucial variables were Bet—or whether or not students made confidence judgments-- 
Strategy—or whether or not students were required to make study time allocation intentions--and 
Intention—or how long students intended to study the item (if required to do so). Note the 
difference between Strategy and Intention: Strategy refers to the between-subjects variable where 
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only half of the subjects were required to make intention decisions at all; Intention refers to (as in 
earlier experiments) the within-subjects variable where subject chose to study “not at all”, “a 
little more”, or “a lot more”. The dependent measures were Intention, Actual Study Time, and 
Accuracy at final test. Again, I looked at Confidence (High/Low) within only the groups who 
were required to make bets for further analyses.  
Procedure 
 The procedure for Experiment 3 was identical to the procedure for Experiment 2. This 
time, however, students were randomly assigned to one of four different groups. The four groups 
were: Bet/Intention, Bet/No Intention, No Bet/Intention, No Bet/No Intention.  
During the initial phase, a concept appeared in the center of the computer screen for four 
and a half seconds. After reading the concept, students in the Bet Groups (Bet/Intention, Bet/No 
Intention) were asked to select either “high confidence” or “low confidence” based on how 
confident they felt that they would get the concept right if they were tested later. The point 
system was the same as the previous experiments.  
 After making this judgment, students in the Bet/Intention Group were asked to decide 
how much more they felt they needed to study each concept, if they were to be given a test later, 
by selecting either  “a lot more,” “a little more,” or “not at all.” Students in the Bet/No Intention 
Group were not given the opportunity to make these study time intentions, and instead, continued 
on to the next concept.  
 Students in the other two groups were not asked to make confidence judgment bets. 
Instead, students in the No Bet/Intention Group were asked to make study time intentions 
directly after viewing the concept. Students in the No Bet/No Intention Group were not asked to 
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make study time intentions either, and instead, viewed the concept for an equivalent amount of 
time as those in the other three groups.   
 Students were then given a chance to study the concepts, and this Actual Study Time 
phase was identical to that of Experiment 2. Finally, everyone was given a final test, which was 
also identical to Experiment 2.   
Results  
 The same coding and analyses that were completed for Experiments 1 and 2 were 
completed for Experiment 3. Additionally, extra analyses were completed due to the different 
groups that were added. The same dependent measures were examined. There were 24 students 
in the Bet/Intention group, 26 students in the Bet/No Intention group, 22 students in the No 
Bet/Intention group, and 26 students in the No Bet/No Intention group.  
Primary Analyses 
 Accuracy. The mean and standard errors for Accuracy as a function of Bet and Intention 
are presented in Table 2110. This analysis looked at students in the Bet/Intention and No 








                                                





Condition    N   M   SE 
Bet     12  
 Not at all      0.80   0.05   
 A little more      0.60   0.08 
 A lot more      0.62   0.10 
No Bet     9 
 Not at all      0.80   0.06 
 A little more      0.60   0.09 
 A lot more      0.61   0.11 
  Table 21: Mean and standard errors for Accuracy by Bet and Intention to Study.  
 While there was no significant difference in Accuracy by Bet, there was a significant 
effect of Intention F(2, 38) = 5.11, MSE = .25, p<.05,  eta = .21. Accuracy was highest for items 
that students intended to study the least. 
 Study time Intention. Table 22 shows the number of times all students in the Bet/Intention 
and No Bet/Intention groups selected “not at all,” “a little more,” or “a lot more” to indicate how 
much more they intended to study.  
 
   Not at all   A little more  A lot more   Total 
Bet   284 (55.0%)  193 (37.4%)  39 (7.6%) 516 
No Bet   327 (61.9%)  164 (31.1%)  37 (7.0%) 528  
 
Table 22: Frequency and percents of Intention by Bet. 
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 The means and standard errors for Intention by Bet and Session are shown in Table 23.  
This analysis looked at students in the Bet/Intention and No Bet/Intention groups only.  
 
Condition   N   M   SE 
Bet    24 
 Session 1     0.56   0.08 
 Session 2     0.50   0.10 
No Bet    22 
 Session 1     0.44   0.08 
 Session 2     0.46   0.09 
Table 23: Means and standard errors for Intention to Study as a function Bet and Session  
 Those who bet intended to study more in both sessions than those who did not bet.  While 
the results did not reach significance it did follow the same numerical patterns obtained in both 
previous experiments.  
 Actual Study Time. The means and standard errors for Actual Study Time by Bet and 







                                                





Condition    N   M   SE 
Bet     12  
 Not at all      2.21   0.53   
 A little more      5.23    1.11 
 A lot more      6.75   1.97 
No Bet      9 
 Not at all      0.95   0.62 
 A little more      2.95   1.28 
 A lot more      7.36   2.29 
Table 24: Means and standard errors for Actual Study Time as a function of Bet and Intention to Study 
 The ANOVA resulted in a significant effect of Intention (F (2, 38) = 11.81, MSE = 
154.94, p<.05, eta = .38). Students spent a greater amount of time studying items they intended 
to study  “a lot more” compared to those they intended to study for a shorter amount of time.  
 An ANOVA for Actual Study Time by Intention was conducted for each Bet condition 
separately. This analysis resulted in a significant effect of Intention for those who bet (F (2, 22) = 
4.14, MSE = 15.26, p <.05 , eta = .27), as well as those who did not bet (F (2, 16) = 9.87, MSE = 
9.82, p<.05 , eta = .55).   
Monitoring Accuracy: High Bets vs. Low Bets 
  As in the previous experiments, those students who bet expressed high confidence. Table 
25 shows the frequency and percentages of high bet and low bet choices by all participants. The 





     Frequency  Percent Mean/Individual 
Session 1 
 Low Bet    175     30.4%  3.65   
 High Bet   400      69.6%  8.33   
 Total    575 
 
Session 2 
 Low Bet   145   28.1%    3.37   
 High Bet   371   71.9%   8.63   
 Total    516 
Table 25: Frequencies and means for selection of high and low bets by Session 
 Accuracy. The means and standard errors for Accuracy as a function of Confidence, in 








                                                




Type of Bet    N    M  SE  
No Bet 
 No Bet/Intentions  22   0.79  0.05 
 No Bet/No Intentions  26   0.77  0.04 
Low Bet 
 Bet/Intentions   22   0.52  0.07 
 Bet/No Intentions  23   0.73  0.07 
High Bet  
 Bet/Intentions   22   0.76  0.04 
 Bet/No Intentions  23   0.90  0.04 
Table 26: Means and standard errors for Accuracy as a function of Confidence (High, Low Bet) and Condition 
 The ANOVA resulted in a significant effect of Confidence (F(1, 43) = 26.91, MSE = .04, 
p<.05, eta = .39) indicating that students did better at final performance for high bet items rather 
than low bet items.   
 Study Time Intention. The means and errors for Intention as a function of Confidence, in 
addition to those in the No Bet group, are shown Table 2713. The analysis included data from the 
Bet/Intention group only. The No Bet group presented in the table includes students who did not 
make bets but did make study time intentions.  
 
 
                                                






Type of Bet    N    M  SE  
No Bet  (No Bet/Intention)  22   0.45  0.08 
Low Bet    20   0.93  0.10 
High Bet    20   0.38  0.09 
Table 27: Means and standard errors for Intention to Study as a function Confidence(high, low bet) and Condition 
 The ANOVA resulted in a significant effect of Confidence (F(1, 19) = 29.55, MSE = .11, 
p<.05, eta = .61) indicating that students wanted to spend a longer amount of time studying low 
bet items than high bet items.  
 Actual Study Time. The means and standard errors for Actual Study Time as a function of 
Confidence, in addition to those in the No Bet groups are shown in Table 28.  
Type of Bet    N    M  SE  
No Bet 
 No Bet/Intention  22   2.84  0.63 
 No Bet/No Intention  26   3.14  0.58 
Low Bet 
 Bet/Intention   22   4.43  0.93 
 Bet/No Intention  23   3.90  0.91 
High Bet 
 Bet/Intention   22   1.88  0.51 
 Bet/No Intention  23   2.29  0.50 




 The ANOVA resulted in a significant effect of Confidence (F(1, 43) = 25.43, MSE = 
25.87, p<.05, eta = .38) indicating that students spent a longer amount of time studying low bet 
items than high bet items.  
Additional Analyses for Experiment 3 
 Since Experiment 3 had more groups (Bet/No Intention, No Bet/Intention) than the 
previous experiments, I was able to conduct further analyses. Specifically, I looked at the effect 
of having students make study time intention decisions.   
 Accuracy. This analysis was completed to see if betting and making study time intentions 
benefited final test performance. The means and standard errors of Accuracy by Bet/Intention 
Group are shown in Table 29.  
 
Group      N   M  SE 
Bet and Study Intentions    24   0.67  0.04 
Bet and No Study Intentions    26   0.86  0.04 
No Bet and Study Intentions    22   0.79  0.04 
No Bet and No Study Intentions   26   0.77  0.04 
Table 29: Mean and standard errors for Accuracy by Bet/Intention Group 
 The ANOVA resulted in a significant effect of Bet/Intention (F(3, 94) = 3.85, MSE = .04, 
p <.05, eta = .11). Those who made bets but did not make study time intentions had the highest 
mean accuracy final performance.   
 Actual Study Time. The next analysis was completed to see if betting and making study 
time intentions influenced actual study time. The means and standard errors of Actual Study Time 




Condition    N   M  SE 
Bet and Study Intentions  24   2.63  0.58  
Bet and No Study Intentions  26   2.68  0.55 
No bet and Study Intentions  22   2.84  0.60 
No Bet and No Study Intentions 26   3.14  0.55 
Table 30: Means and standard errors for Actual Study Time by Bet/Intention  
There were no differences in how long the different groups studied. 
Secondary Analyses: Combining “A lot more study” and “A little more study” 
 As in the previous experiments, the variable Intention was collapsed into two levels, 
instead of three. The means and standard errors for Accuracy as a function of Bet and Combined 
Intention are shown in Table 3114. 
Condition    N    M  SE  
Bet     20 
 No more study     0.73  0.05 
 More study      0.65  0.06 
No Bet     20 
 No more study      0.83  0.05 
 More study      0.73  0.06 
Table 31: Means and standard errors for Accuracy as a function of Bet and Combined Intention to Study 
                                                
14 Note the decrease in N due to the fact that some students did not choose both intention options. 
  
53 
 The ANOVA resulted in a significant effect of Combined Intention (F(1, 38) =5.46, MSE 
= 1.16, p= <.05, eta = .13), indicating that students  did better on items they did not want to study 
at all compared to items they wanted to study more.  
 The means and standard errors for Actual Study Time as a function of Bet and Combined 
Intention are shown in Table 32.  
 
Condition    N    M  SE  
Bet     20 
 No more study     1.96  0.47 
 More study      3.86  0.98 
No Bet     20 
 No more study      1.92  0.47 
 More study      5.24  0.98 
Table 32: Means and standard errors for Actual Study Time as a function of Bet and Combined Intention to Study 
 The ANOVA resulted in a significant effect of Combined Intention (F(1, 38) = 22.24, 
MSE = 6.11, p<.05, eta = .37), indicating that students had a tendency to spend a longer amount 
of time studying items they intended, as compared to did not intend, to study. 
Conclusion 
 In Experiments 1 and 2, students who made bets had intentions of studying longer than 
student who did not make bets. Here, the pattern followed in the same direction, but did not 
reach statistical significance. Similar to previous results, intending to study longer was not 
carried out with actual study time. Thus, as expected, increases in final test performance did not 
occur. All students did perform better on the high bet items, which is also not surprising because 
they studied the low bet items for an insufficient amount of time.  
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CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY 
 The primary question in the current research was: Do students who are required to bet 
perform better than those who were not required to bet? For all three experiments, there was no 
difference in Accuracy at final performance. However, there was an effect of Intention (only a 
trend for Experiment 1), indicating that students were aware of which items they knew better 
than others (see Figure 6). 
         Experiment 1     Experiment 2    Experiment 3 
 
Figure 6: Mean accuracy at final performance.  
 Although there was no difference in Accuracy, the next question was to see why there 
was no difference. I first asked whether students who were required to bet intended to study 
longer than those were not required to bet? For Experiments 1 and 2, those who made bets 
intended to study longer than those who did not make bets. The same numerical pattern was 
found in Experiment 3 (see Figure 7).   
    Experiment 1              Experiment 2    Experiment 3 
 
Figure 7: Mean study time intention  
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 A third question was: Do students who were required to bet (and as a result, intended to 
study more than those not required to bet) actually study longer than those were not required to 
bet? For all three experiments, there was no difference in Actual Study Time between those who 
bet and those who did not. However, there was an effect of Intention, indicating that students 
spent a longer amount of time studying items they intended to study more (see Figure 8). 
  Experiment 1       Experiment 2       Experiment 3  
Figure 8: Mean actual study time  
 Another main variable of interest was Confidence, or how students’ accuracy at final 
performance, study time intentions, and actual study time varied according to their type of bet.  
One main question in terms of Confidence is: Do students perform better on high bet items 
compared to low bet items? For all three experiments, students performed better on high bet 
items (although this did not reach significance for Experiment 1, most likely due to a ceiling 
effect - See Figure 9).  
       Experiment 1                        Experiment 2                 Experiment 3 
Figure 9: Mean accuracy performance by confidence 
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 Do students intend to study low bet items for a longer amount of time than high bet 
items? For all three experiments, students intended to study low bet items for a longer amount of 
time than high bet items, emphasizing that when making bets, learners are acutely aware of 
which items need more study and which do not (see Figure 10).   
  Experiment 1   Experiment 2   Experiment 3 
 
Figure 10: Mean study time intention by confidence         
 Students in the Bet group across the three experiments also spent a longer amount of time 
studying low bet than high bet items, indicating that they were being strategic. The problem 
seemed not to be a lack of strategy, but rather, too little study on the whole (see Figure 11). 
      Experiment 1           Experiment 2               Experiment 3 
 
Figure 11: Mean actual study time by confidence  
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION 
 The use of metacognitive strategies has been shown to be essential for improving 
learning by allowing learners to make profitable study decisions (Kornell & Metcalfe, 2006, 
Metcalfe & Finn, 2008). The current studies focused on implementing a betting paradigm in a 
Biology classroom to see its effects on learners' study decisions. Basic results showed that people 
are generally good at monitoring their own knowledge, in that students performed better on items 
judged with high confidence than on items judged with low confidence. This is perhaps 
surprising, given what we know about overconfidence from empirical reports, as well as 
fortunate, given that students can use their own knowledge to make effective study decisions, 
such as those of study time allocation. Indeed, the students in the current study spent more time 
studying items judged with low confidence than with high confidence. 
 The crucial result was that when students were required to bet, as compared to those not 
required to bet, they reported that, on average, they needed more time to study the items. This 
finding complements the original ideas of Schneider (1985) who proposed that children have 
difficulty monitoring their own memories because they rarely think about their own memories. 
Thus, although it is important to improve the accuracy of people's metacognitive judgments, the 
current study takes a step back to show that it seems important to first encourage people to 
merely deliberate about their own learning.  This study is unique because although actual study 
time has been explored in the metacognitive literature, the intention to study has not. This is a 
critical step because by only looking at actual study time, it is impossible to know why there is a 
breakdown in the metacognitive chain. One novel aspect of the current research is that I have 
included a measure of intentions, and found that students are aware of how much they should 
study. However, a breakdown seems to occur after this point, where students do not differentiate 
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their actual study time. This suggests that there may be a motivation or memory breakdown after 
successfully completing the intention step.  
 Intentions to study should translate into an increase in actual study, and finally, a boost in 
final test performance, according to a metacognitive chain. However, no performance differences 
between those who bet and those who didn’t were found. And, it appears as though a breakdown 
occurred during actual study time. Interestingly, my data show that even though students who bet 
said they intended to study longer than those who did not, they did not follow through on their 
intentions.  
 In general, students in the current study simply did not spending enough time studying. 
While the current research demonstrates the importance of improving students’ metacognitive 
processing, in that it can impact study intentions, we are left with the question of why there is a 
breakdown in the metacognitive chain when it comes to actual study.  
 The breakdown during actual study does not appear to be an issue of relative knowing, as 
students, throughout all three experiments, differentiated their study time effectively, spending 
more time studying items rated with low confidence compared to items rated with high 
confidence. Instead, it appears as though there is a breakdown in their perception of absolute 
study time. For the concepts used in these experiments, as in most studying situations, there is a 
certain amount of time that information must be studied in order for success on final test. There 
is also the factor of how much time students think they need to study in order to be successful. It 
seems as though there may be a large discrepancy between these two factors. Students may have 
illusions of thinking items are much easier to learn than they are, which results in students 
ceasing their study prematurely – a typical display of overconfidence. Even for items that 
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students expressed a lack of confidence in, they did not choose to study those items for more 
than just a few seconds.  
 The issue of why students who bet do not actually study more than those who don’t bet, 
even though they had intentions of studying more, is complex. It is possible, that there is a 
memory issue, where students simply forgot what their intentions were. Perhaps if students were 
provided with reminders of their intentions, during the actual study time phase, they would have 
been more likely to follow through on their intentions. It is also possible that they lack 
motivation. Perhaps, in this situation, there was not enough at stake. It would be interesting to 
see if students’ actual study time would increase if they had more to gain (or lose). While the 
betting paradigm did force them to engage in metacognitive processing which resulted in them 
wanting to study more, it was not enough to increase motivation.  
 Another finding that is worth noting is the decrease in the percent of high bets during the 
second trial for Experiment 2. While during the first trial, students had a much greater tendency 
to select high confidence rather than low confidence, the reverse was true in Session 2. The 
simple act of taking the test at the end of the first session was enough to discover that they did 
not know as much as they thought they knew. This finding is consistent with previous research 
that has found that people’s judgments of learning were inflated compared to their performance 
upon first exposure (Dunlosky & Nelson, 1992; Koriat, Sheffer, & Ma’ayan, 2002). Finn & 
Metcalfe (2007) proposed that the source of this underconfidence with practice effect (Koriat, 
Sheffer, & Ma’ayan, 2002) may be due to individuals memory for past test. When students make 
judgments of learning, they may rely on information of their performance from a previous test.  
 When exploring the results from all three experiments, another interesting finding 
emerged. Students studied for longer on paper (Experiment 1) than on the computer 
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(Experiments 2 and 3). Perhaps familiarity with studying on paper helps foster a metacognitive 
framework or a setting that is more true to real-world study – where motivation is high.  
Furthermore, for the paper experiment, students were able to read the concepts and make the 
judgments at their own pace during the initial presentation of concepts. For experiments 2 and 3, 
however, students were presented with the concept for four- and-a- half seconds before having to 
make a decision.   
 In further support of this possibility, I conducted an informal survey with current ninth 
grade Biology students in which they were presented with a handout that contained the twenty-
four concepts used in Experiments 2 and 3. Students had previously learned about half of the 
concepts on the handout. Concepts they had previously learned were designated “easy” while 
concepts they have yet to learn were designated “hard.” Students were asked to write down the 
amount of time they thought they would need to study each concept in order to be certain that 
they would get a question related to that concept correct on a test the next day. Students were not 
timed and were permitted to answer at their own pace.  Results from this quick survey showed 
that students wanted to study, on average, three minutes for “easy” items and close to eight 
minutes for “hard” items.  Not only were students able to differentiate between hard and easy 
items, demonstrating monitoring accuracy, but it seems that once again, paper learning seems to 
encourage students to want to study more -- which they might actually do.  
      Limitations 
 A major goal of the current experiments was to apply a metacognitive processing task to 
a real-world educational setting with students who need help in their learning strategies. In order 
to do this, students completed the experiments in the same classroom at the same time, instead of 
individually. It is possible that students were influenced by their classmates, especially during 
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the actual study time phase. Although the initial presentation of new information, as well as tests 
are given under similar conditions as were seen in these experiments, the process of studying 
usually occurs on more of an individual basis. Therefore, the actual study time phase of this 
experiment may not have been truly representative of what may have occurred if students were 
studying alone.  
 In most educational settings, a test is often associated with a grade that can in some way 
affect your future goals. It is for this reason, that students often take tests quite seriously, in 
hopes of obtaining the highest score possible. In the current experiments, the final tests that 
students took had no bearing on their classroom grades, and therefore could not impact them in 
any significant way. Keeping this in mind, it is possible that students did not put forth as much 
effort during study as they may have if the test was of greater value to them.  That is, there just 
may not have been enough at stake in this situation. 
 Another factor that may have influenced the results is that students completed their 
studying on a computer, as opposed to paper, which is a more typical way of studying, especially 
for high school students. Students of this generation spend a large amount of their time using all 
sorts of technology (computers, video-games, ipods) and the use of a computer may cause them 
to become impatient and make less deliberate decisions. The act of studying on a computer may 
have encouraged students to “click” through terms faster than they would have under normal 
studying circumstances. As the use of computer technology in education increases, how the 
behaviors of students will change remains an open question. 
 A final limitation of the current study is that there was a loss in the number of subjects 
that were included in many of the analyses. Since subjects were asked to make individual 
choices, their responses varied, and there were instances when subjects did not select each 
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possible option (i.e. some subjects never selected low bet, or never intended to study items “a lot 
more”).  While these methods of investigation may not be ideal, in terms of data analysis, they 
do reflect, fairly accurately, the type of choices students make during real-world study.  
      Implications 
Metacognitive investigations have shed light on the educational importance of helping 
students distinguish between what they know and what they do not know. During study, the 
learner needs to decide which items to study and which items to ignore. The learner also needs to 
decide whether to continue studying or to stop studying a particular item. In order to make such 
study decisions, two things need to occur: (1) Judgments need to be made in the first place, and 
(2) those judgments must be accurate. The ability to know how easy or how well learned an item 
is has been shown to be fundamental to strategy formation during study (Koriat & Goldsmith, 
1996; Son, 2010; Son & Metcalfe, 2000; Thiede & Dunlosky, 1999). However, these 
metacognitive studies are often limited to a laboratory setting where it is nearly impossible to 
achieve perfect real-world scenarios. On the other hand, many studies that have been conducted 
in the “real-world” have lost the element of experiment control. The current study is unique in 
that it implements an experimentally controlled lab procedure in a real-world classroom setting, 
bridging existing barriers between psychological research and educational practice.  
The implications these research methods had on individual learning were consistent. By 
persuading people to make bets when learning, their future study decisions had the potential to 
be altered in a more favorable way. Considering that the learner may ignore this vital element of 
making deliberate judgments about ongoing learning, it may be beneficial for educators to 
implement similar strategies that would encourage students to engage in metacognitive 
processing. And given that people, especially students, often exhibit overconfidence (Koriat, et 
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al., 1980, Fischhoff et al., 1977), providing them with an opportunity to assess their knowledge, 
may mitigate their illusions of knowing. Once these illusions have been eliminated, students may 
make more strategic study decisions on their own.  
The method used in the current study would largely benefit students in any classroom 
setting. Using this behavioral betting paradigm, students are forced to engage in metacognitive 
processes without having to take part in an invasive intervention. Instead, students in these 
experiments enjoyed making confidence judgments as it is set up in a game-like fashion. This 
paradigm would be easy for teachers to incorporate into their classrooms as it can be 
incorporated into class work, homework, or even tests and assessments. By asking students to 
make confidence bets, students can engage in metacognitive processing they would not have 
done spontaneously. The betting paradigm may also be included in a study guide where students 
are asked to provide confidence bets for each concept. Then, after they take the test, the teacher 
may include extra points on the test based on the bets they made during study. Students would be 
motivated to engage in metacognitive processes, which should then influence their study 
strategies.  
Even the most motivated students may feel uncertain as to how to optimize their studying 
in order to maximize their final performance. Students are often overwhelmed by the copious 
amount of information they must study and do not know how to organize their study. If provided 
the opportunity to engage in metacognitive processing, through betting, students are given the 
chance to learn how to organize their study on their own. Once students have made confidence 
bets, they should be able to adjust their studying accordingly. Ideally, after repeated exposure to 





 My data show that this particular group of high school Biology students benefited from 
the betting implementation in that they intended to study for longer than those who were not 
given the implementation. However, those intentions, unfortunately, did not translate into actual 
study. Further investigation is necessary to determine why there was a breakdown at this point in 
the metacognitive chain. As suggested earlier, it is possible that students simply forgot their 
study time intentions. In order to address this possibility, a future study may provide students 
with reminders of their study time intentions during the actual study time phase.  
 Additionally, considering that the breakdown occurred during actual study time, I might 
implement changes into this phase. On the computer, it is possible that they simply clicked 
through the terms they wanted to very quickly, which is often the type of environment computer 
games and other forms of technology foster. A future study may alter the actual study phase by 
having students study on paper. Paper flashcards, for instance, may be more similar to the 
manner in which learning occurs daily, and may encourage more deliberate thought.  
 Finally, students are likely to feel overconfident during study. This can lead to an 
inappropriate or insufficient amount of study, and consequently, poor test performance. Future 
research should seek to find improved methods to alleviate such prevalent illusions. 
Final Conclusion 
 The prevalence of overconfidence during study is a substantial problem because it leads 
learners to use sub-optimal study strategies and low test performance. Thus, a key to improving 
learning is to diminish these erroneous judgments. In these studies, I found that explicitly 
requiring a more deliberate metacognitive process may be beneficial for this goal. Requiring 
students to make bets resulted in a more appropriate discrimination of how much time was 
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needed to study a list of definitions. Unfortunately, those good intentions were not carried out 
when actually studying the items. Continuing to explore the reasons for this and other potential 
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Heterotrophs organisms that cannot produce their own food. 
Glycogen molecule that functions as long term storage of 
glucose in animals. 
Starch molecule that functions as long term storage of 
glucose in plants. 
Carbon dioxide Gas needed for photosynthesis to occur. 
Ribosome organelle in a cell where protein synthesis 
occurs. 
Oviduct site of internal fertilization. 
Meiosis process that produces gametes. 
Mitosis process that produces body cells. 
Mutation any change in the DNA sequence. 
Receptors protein molecules on cell membranes involved 
in cellular communication. 
Insulin hormone that decreases blood sugar level. 




Macrophages white blood cells that engulf and digest 
pathogens. 
B cells white blood cells that secrete antibodies. 
Amino acids subunits of a protein. 
Independent variable the variable in an experiment that is 
manipulated by the experimenter. 
Dependent variable the variable in the experiment that is measured. 
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Guard cells structures that regulate gas exchange and water 
loss in a leaf. 
Pancreas organ that secretes insulin. 
Paper chromatography lab technique that separates pigments. 
Gel electrophoresis lab technique that separates DNA fragments. 
Diffusion  a process by which molecules move from a 
high concentration to a low concentration. 
Active transport a process by which molecules move from a 
low concentration to a high concentration.  
   
 
 
 
